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T urkish society, economy, and poli-tics have been going through funda-
mental changes since the country shifted from 
state-centered import substitution policies to 
economic liberalization. As of the early 1980s, 
the Özal government began to promote a cul-
ture of entrepreneurship. Scholars have long 
examined the political and economic implica-
tions of this change. What has not been clearly 
analyzed, however, is how these transforma-
tions fundamentally altered the class dynam-
ics. In this article, we argue that the growth 
of new capitalist classes transformed social 
stratification, multi-party politics and the in-
ternational political orientation of the coun-
try. New business groups energized by Islam 
have facilitated much needed class mobility. In 
this process, there also emerged a confronta-
tional split in middle class positions between 
Islamic versus secular political outlooks. The 
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The growth of new capitalist classes 
since the 1980s has transformed social 
stratification, multi-party politics and 
the international political orientation 
of Turkey. New business groups 
energized by Islam have facilitated 
much-needed class mobility. In this 
process, there has also emerged a 
confrontational split in middle-class 
positions between Islamic and secular 
political outlooks. These new middle 
classes are engaged in promoting 
Islam as a strategic resource in the 
class politics of Turkey and seek 
protection from the negative effects of 
market capitalism. More dramatically, 
these new capitalist classes have 
redefined the allocation of markets 
and the distribution of assets while 
they have increased opportunities 
for their affiliated groups at home 
and in foreign markets. However, 
the paradox between modernity and 
authenticity remains unresolved 
for Turkey’s old middle classes and 
the new pious elite alike. Although the 
Islamic-leaning business groups have 
become the winners of the new regime, 
they have increasingly lost their 
cutting-edge idealism and originality 
and are being “normalized” as the 
new establishment.
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expansion of new middle classes fuelled 
economic growth, industrial diffusion 
to Anatolian towns, and a rapid rise in 
export capacity. More dramatically, these 
new capitalist classes redefined the allo-
cation of markets and the distribution of 
assets while they expanded opportunities 
for their affiliated groups at home and in 
foreign markets.
This work should be seen as a contri-
bution to the scholarly debate about social change and the rise of Islamic business 
groups through the analysis of social class and identity politics. We regard the 
growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and new industrial centers 
in Anatolia to be the engines of change in class dynamics. Although there has been 
much discussion about Islam in Turkish society and politics1 and the relationship 
between economic liberalization and a new Islamic leaning bourgeoisie2 there are 
few empirically grounded sociological studies of new industrialists and the rise of 
second tier industrial towns. In the following sections, we illustrate how a better 
analysis of the “Anatolisation of industrial capital” can help us to understand the 
new class dynamics and centre-periphery relations. Our analysis shows how Is-
lamic mobilization emerges as a strategic resource in class dynamics, opportunity 
allocation and moral justification.
In the following sections we will examine three arguments. First, we will show 
why the emergence of a new generation of Anatolian capitalists and their wealth 
accumulation are important to understand changing class dynamics. Second, we 
will show how the promotion of Islamic values energized business groups and led 
to new political formations. Third, we will illustrate how the increasing influence 
of Islam has led to an identity contest and search for authenticity in class dynam-
ics. Finally, we will explain the implications of these for foreign trade relations, as 
the new business classes search to expand their opportunities abroad. Our conclu-
sion will highlight the dilemmas of the future relations between the new capitalist 
classes and Islamist politics.
Emergence of a Post-1980 Social Stratification 
The foundations of the modern Turkish Republic rested on a top-down state 
tradition governed by a state recruited elite in the civil service, the army, and in 
politics. Centralist tendencies in governance allocated a greater role to Ankara-
based institutions in all spheres of public service (such as the State Planning Or-
New business groups energized 
by Islam have facilitated much 
needed class mobility. The 
expansion of new middle 
classes fuelled economic 
growth, industrial diffusion to 
Anatolian towns, and a rapid 
rise in export capacity
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ganization, government ministries, the 
central bank and the army). The state 
was not only the major investor in heavy 
industries, energy and infrastructure, 
but it also managed them with an exten-
sive administrative bureaucracy until the 
1980s. Infrastructure and development 
investments were planned and executed 
centrally without seeking local participation or regional involvement. In the mar-
ket, state-run enterprises were accompanied by a handful of large private business 
conglomerates, which controlled major sectors of the economy.3 The majority of 
privately owned small businesses were localized micro enterprises. Business con-
glomerates functioned as the main conduits for western companies and trade. 
They, along with the state, controlled the entry of foreign technology, new products 
and modern production to the domestic market. The family-run conglomerates 
established and/or headquartered in Istanbul diversified their investments into a 
variety of sectors and they concentrated the private industrial capital of the whole 
economy. Import substitution policies aimed to protect the domestic market from 
international competition, with a range of selective incentive mechanisms, aided 
the growth of indigenous industrial capacity. Industrial conglomerates initially es-
tablished themselves in the Istanbul and Izmit axis and the port cities of Izmir and 
Adana. Later in the 1970s, large firms engaged in foreign franchises and extended 
their distribution networks across the country (especially in detergent, consumer 
goods, electronic appliances and pharmaceutical products).4
State procurement at both local and national levels helped private businesses 
and gave a jump-start to the growth of the first wave of entrepreneurs and the 
associated urban bourgeoisie in many Anatolian towns. However, most of the 
Anatolian land mass remained rural and isolated despite development projects 
and infrastructure investments. There was virtually no inter-regional or interna-
tional trade outside of the state owned enterprises. Local economies rested on 
small artisanship, commerce, and agriculture. Increasing demand for consumer 
goods and the diffusion of franchised services fuelled the growth of a small busi-
ness elite within Anatolia’s emerging urban centers. Along with the civil servants 
and professionals, they shared local privileges and the benefits of municipal infra-
structure and services until the 1980s.5 A clear majority of the working population 
was employed in agriculture; they, along with small entrepreneurs and artisans, 
formed the stratum beneath the state sponsored middle class professionals and 
the local elite.
The foundations of the modern 
Turkish Republic rested on 
a top-down state tradition 
governed by a state recruited 
elite in the civil service, the 
army, and in politics
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As the population grew and Tur-
key urbanized, social dynamics began 
to change rapidly. Migration from the 
countryside and the small towns of Ana-
tolia to several large cities began in the 
1950s and accelerated in the decades to 
follow. By the 1970s, semi-legal housing 
areas (commonly known as Gecekondu) 
became widespread while low skilled ca-
sual or informal jobs absorbed the majority of the working population in all major 
cities.6 Rural migrants in urban areas formed the bottom of the social stratifi-
cation. The growing size of the economically marginalized urban population in 
Gecekondu areas, however, fundamentally changed the seemingly stable political 
balance established between the state elites and their private sector counterparts 
on the one side and peasants and the urban poor on the other. As demand for 
jobs and better living conditions rapidly rose, pressure on the political system 
continued to mount. By 1980, the urban population overtook the rural population 
for the first time in modern Turkish history and rural migrants moved from the 
margins to the centre of local government politics.7 
Turkey witnessed widespread social unrest, as the urban poor became increas-
ingly politicized throughout the 1970s. The professional middle classes and ur-
ban youth combined their forces with the lower stratum against social injustices 
and inequitable wealth distribution. However, the real cause of this unrest was 
the slowing down of opportunities for upward mobility, as the state controlled 
economy performed badly under domestic and international constraints. Thus, 
expectations for social mobility for the lower strata and revolutionary urban mid-
dle classes induced them to unite their efforts to bring about a more equitable eco-
nomic allocating regime. These groups were mobilized by socialist ideology and 
left wing politics. Starting from the 1970s, this interclass alliance in most urban 
areas fed into youth organizations, trade unions, and party politics. To capitalize 
on this societal movement, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) shifted towards 
leftist politics. Its then new charismatic leader, Bülent Ecevit, promoted the party 
among the young and disenfranchised urban and rural populations. The CHP’s 
campaign for equality and socialist ideals won over 33 per cent of total votes in 
the 1973 general elections.8 In the 1977 general elections, the party had a stunning 
success, as it received 41.4 per cent of total votes.9 In the three largest cities, the 
CHP received more than half of the total votes; this was one of the strongest urban 
support given to a single political party in Turkish electoral history.
Although efforts were 
undertaken to liberalize the 
economy during previous 
governments, it was Özal who 
brought about long-lasting 
changes in the fundamental 
structure of the economy
Economic Liberalization and Class Dynamics in Turkey: New Business Groups and Islamic Mobilization
67
The shortage of goods, especially 
foodstuffs, fuelled deep insecurity and 
public protests across the country dur-
ing the final years of the 1970s. Despite 
its electoral victory, the CHP had to form 
weak coalition governments and got em-
broiled in a deepening rift between right 
and left politics. Facing a tough US-led 
embargo in the aftermath of the 1974 
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, 
the government had almost no room to maneuver. Hostile US policies and tough-
ening internal opposition by powerful business groups paralyzed the policy arena, 
forcing the CHP to shelve some of its much-publicized projects. These included 
the critical town and village development projects and enterprise reforms through 
the establishment of multi-ownership companies.10
Following the 1980 coup and the subsequent partial withdrawal of the gen-
erals from politics in 1983, the former technocrat, Prime Minister Turgut Özal, 
shifted policies from import substitution to economic liberalization. Although ef-
forts were undertaken to liberalize the economy during previous governments, it 
was Özal who brought about long-lasting changes in the fundamental structure of 
the economy. For example, “the 24th January 1980 Decisions” were announced in 
order to curb inflation and to attain a more outward-oriented and market-based 
economic system. Within the framework of these decisions, export subsidies were 
granted and exchange rates were allowed to depreciate in real terms. However, 
with almost no political opposition and a disoriented society, bold reform poli-
cies were put forward and rigorously implemented by a centre-right political al-
liance headed by the Motherland Party (ANAP). Subsequent policies favored by 
the army and right wing parties supported a so-called “Turkish-Islamic” synthesis 
to defend against communism and threats of social disintegration. In less than a 
decade, predominantly left-leaning urban voters transferred their alliance to the 
centre right. ANAP became a patchwork of the centre right, liberals, Islamists, 
and secularists while promoting the ideology of right wing neo-liberalism. This 
new regime aimed to deepen the market and curb the direct role of the state 
in the economy through de-regulation and privatization. Export-led economic 
growth policies and subsequent liberalization and privatization followed IMF pre-
scriptions and the models of Reaganomics and Thatcherism. An entrepreneurial 
society and the pursuit of wealth formed the core principals of this neo-liberal 
thinking. Small and medium-sized businesses emerged as a panacea for economic 
An entrepreneurial society and 
the pursuit of wealth formed 
the core principals of this 
neo-liberal thinking. Small 
and medium-sized businesses 
emerged as a panacea for 
economic re-structuring and 
privatization
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re-structuring and privatization, and de-
regulation aimed to reduce state control 
and to break down the resistance of or-
ganized labor. Multi-ownership compa-
nies, village, and town projects and other 
state led planning and investments dis-
appeared from the agenda.
As the Turkish economy recovered 
from endemic shortages, exports steadily rose from 2.9 billion USD in 1980 to 
12.9 billion USD in 1990 and continued to increase thereafter. By 2009, this figure 
had reached 132 billion USD (see Table 1). However, export-led growth also in-
creased Turkey’s exposure to international financial markets and foreign debt and 
created a highly imbalanced export and import regime. Economic liberalization 
and new entrepreneurialism stimulated urban growth and industrialization in 
Anatolia. Industrial production, mostly in the traditional manufacturing sectors 
of textiles and foodstuffs, began to spread into medium-sized Anatolian towns 
while capital flight from rural to urban areas increased. Agriculture ceased to be 
the leading export sector as manufacturing came to account for over 75 per cent 
of total exports by 2000. Between 1980 and 1999, the urban population increased 
dramatically, from 44 to 74 per cent of the total population. This massive increase 
in the urban population was in part a result of diffused industrialization but it 
was also linked to increasing regional inequalities, rising societal expectations and 
the lack of personal security in conflict zones. In addition to large cities, regional 
urban centers attracted a significant share of this migration and led to a growth 
spurt of second tier regions such as Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Konya, and Kayseri, all 
of which exceeded one million in population during this period. 
A new generation of indigenous entrepreneurs and conservative Anatolian ur-
banites began to undermine the state elite and their middle class allies. The popu-
larity of traditional right wing parties diminished throughout the 1990s, as they 
became embroiled in banking scandals, political sleaze, and the war with the PKK. 
Throughout the early years of liberalization, as was the case previously, SMEs had 
almost no access to affordable financial capital, export markets, and new technol-
ogies. Thus, their engagement with the export-led liberal growth regime was ini-
tially peripheral while the major beneficiaries were the family conglomerates and 
multinational capital. Similarly, the urban poor, pensioners, and low wage earners 
were among the losers of the new economic order. In the political arena, the left 
wing parties failed to recover from the ground they had lost after the purges that 
A new generation of 
indigenous entrepreneurs 
and conservative Anatolian 
urbanites began to undermine 
the state elite and their middle 
class allies
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followed the military coup, the disintegration of the communist regimes in East-
ern Europe, and the dissolution of the USSR. The Refah Party benefitting from 
disillusion with mainstream politics, and mobilized by Islamist ideals drew sup-
port from the disenfranchised lower social classes. In a society with much resent-
ment but no clear opposition, Islamist politics emerged as a new political force.
The Islamist political discourse was not entirely new to Turkish politics; its 
roots can be found in the intellectual discourse over the early modernization at-
tempts of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. The modern revival of 
Islamist politics was initially subsumed within the Democrat Party (DP) after its 
electoral successes in the 1950s. It came out of the shadows of the centre right 
politics when the predecessor of the Refah Party, the National Salvation Party 
(MSP), was formed under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in 1972. Islamist 
politics played a significant role in the party until the MSP was closed down along 
with other political parties by the 1980 military coup government. The party ob-
tained over 10 per cent of votes in the 1973 elections and even joined a short-lived 
coalition government led by CHP in 1974. As the speed of liberalization intensi-
fied in the 1980s and 1990s, this created new winners and losers. Thus, Islamic 
groups expanded their societal influence through Islamic brotherhoods and busi-
ness networks. 
With the Islamic brotherhoods’ extensive network of charity and philan-
thropy, they were able to reach out to the dispossessed and marginalized groups. 
Throughout the 1990s, they aggressively recruited and expanded their social base. 
The Refah Party took over the management of Turkey’s two major cities (An-
kara and Istanbul) for the first time when they won mayoral elections in 1994. 
Decentralization increased the powers of elected local governments in economic 
development and generated new opportunities for local businesses. This gave way 
to the rise of the economic power of Islamic groups at the local level through mu-
nicipal procurement, construction, and real estate development. The Refah Party 
propaganda initially maintained its MSP line and propagated an anti-western and 
an anti-EU stance. The Party, like their leftist political counterparts two decades 
previously, claimed to bring about societal justice on a grand scale through a “Just 
Order” (Adil Düzen) by confronting what they then saw as the corrupt moral val-
ues of capitalism. These policies included the establishment of an Islamic curren-
cy and an Islamic common market, along with the promotion of multi-ownership 
companies and heavy industries under state-led developmentalizm. These ideas 
were especially effective among the urban poor and those small businessmen who 
considered themselves as the losers of the early years of neo-liberalism.11
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Small business owners developed a strong antipathy towards the family cartels 
that controlled the country’s economy as well as the inefficient state enterprises. 
This crystallized around an idealized notion of hard-working, genuine Anatolian 
people with Islamic traditions, as opposed to cosmopolitan and disingenuous Is-
tanbul capitalists. When the secular establishment and the army began to see the 
Refah Party as a growing and seemingly popular threat to the secular regime, they 
sought to ban it from politics and they intervened to dissolve the coalition govern-
ment in 1997. The turning point was the 2002 general elections, which resulted 
in the victory of the newly formed AK Party under the leadership of a young 
cadre that had split from Erbakan’s Refah Party. This new generation of leaders, 
who came from lower and middle class families, saw their future opportunities 
in alliance with the neo-liberal economic order. Instead of promoting an Islamic 
union, they saw engagement with the USA and EU as a strategic asset in domes-
tic political power building. Without questioning the basis of their predecessors’ 
fiscal and economic policies, the AK Party government continued to implement 
macroeconomic stability and financial responsibility practices that were part of 
the IMF stability program. These directly followed suit and were in line with the 
Ecevit government’s reforms in the aftermath of the 2001 banking and financial 
sector crises. The AK Party modified Refah’s political platform to accommodate 
the ambitions of Anatolian business groups and their middle class allies. 
Table 1. Turkey’s Foreign Trade Since 1923
     Balance of Volume of
                         Exports                    Imports  Foreign Foreign Proportion
     Trade Trade of
       Imports
       covered
Yıllar Value Change Value Change Value Value by Exports
Years ‘000 $ % ‘000 $ % ‘000 $ ‘000 $ %
1923 50 790  86 872  -36 082 137 662 58.5
1930 71 380 -4.6 69 540 -43.7 1 840 140 920 102.6
1940 80 904 -18.8 50 035 -45.9 30 869 130 939 161.7
1950 263 424 6.3 285 664 -1.6 -22 240 549 088 92.2
1960 320 731 -9.3 468 186 -0.4 -147 455 788 917 68.5
1970 588 476 9.6 947 604 18.3 -359 128 1 536 081 62.1
1975 1 401 075 -8.6 4 738 558 25.4 -3 337 483 6 139 633 29.6
1980 2 910 122 28.7 7 909 364 56.0 -4 999 242 10 819 486 36.8
1985 7 958 010 11.6 11 343 376 5.5 -3 385 367 19 301 386 70.2
1990 12 959 288 11.5 22 302 126 41.2 -9 342 838 35 261 413 58.1
1995 21 637 041 19.5 35 709 011 53.5 -14 071 970 57 346 052 60.6
2000 27 774 906 4.5 54 502 821 34.0 -26 727 914 82 277 727 51.0
2005 73 476 408 16.3 116 774 151 19.7 -43 297 743 190 250 559 62.9
2008 132 027 196 23.1  201 963 574 18.8 -69 936 378 333 990 770 65.4
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4
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Table 2. Distribution of Manufacturing Industry Enterprises (MIEs) in New Anatolian
Industrial Centers (According to Size Groups)
Provinces MIEs           1980          1990          2000
Denizli  Groups  MIEs % MIEs % MIEs %
  10-49  88 1.34 55 0.95 268 3.84
  50-199  22 1.53 25 1.21 95 3.23
  200+  7 1.02 19 1.83 53 4.41
  Total  117 1.34 99 1.12 416 3.74
Gaziantep 10-49  116 1.76 70 1.21 174 2.50
  50-199  16 1.11 32 1.54 60 2.04
  200+  8 1.17 15 1.45 25 2.08
  Total  140 1.61 117 1.32 259 2.33
Kayseri  10-49  68 1.03 59 1.02 94 1.35
  50-199  19 1.32 29 1.40 58 1.97
  200+  15 2.19 21 2.03 26 2.16
  Total  102 1.17 109 1.23 178 1.60
Çorum  10-49  52 0.79 59 1.02 52 0.75
  50-199  3 0.21 20 0.97 32 1.09
  200+  1 0.15 2 0.19 3 0.25
  Total  56 0.64 81 0.91 87 0.78
Kahraman Maraş 10-49  15 0.23 31 0.54 43 0.62
  50-199  2 0.14 3 0.14 15 0.51
  200+  2 0.29 7 0.68 10 0.83
  Total  19 0.22 41 0.46 68 0.61
Other Provinces 10-49  6247 94.85 5488 95.24 6341 90.95
  50-199  1375 95.69 1963 94.74 2684 91.17
  200+  651 95.18 973 93.83 1085 90.27
  Total  8273 95.02 8424 94.96 10110 90.23
Turkey  10-49  6586 100 5762 100 6972 100
  50-199  1437 100 2072 100 2944 100
  200+  684 100 1037 100 1202 100
  Total  8707 100 8871 1003.84 11118 100
Source: State Institute of Statistics Database (2004) cited in Özaslan (2005)
New Entrepreneurship Energized by Islam
The growth of entrepreneurialism energized by Islam accelerated the rate of 
capital accumulation and export-led growth, which in turn facilitated the rise of 
indigenous Anatolian entrepreneurs.12 A new pattern of wealth and capital accu-
mulation changed the outlook of Anatolian towns along with the growth of the 
new middle classes. For the first time in several centuries, large numbers of Mus-
lims, who had previously shied away from capitalist endeavors, engaged in entre-
preneurship. These middle classes relied upon indigenous private sector develop-
ment and opportunistic entrepreneurship. Following the Customs Union agree-
ment, signed in 1995, EU-Turkey relations deepened in trade and other forms 
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of exchange. Many SMEs began looking 
for new business opportunities in Euro-
pean markets as well as Russia and the 
CIS (Common Wealth of Independent 
States) and they found many niche mar-
kets to penetrate. However, they were 
unwilling to support a political party 
that was promoting an Islamic currency 
or the establishment of an Islamic com-
mon market. Capitalizing on this busi-
ness pragmatism and realizing the new 
opportunities abroad, this second wave of Islamic politics followed a diametrically 
opposite path to what the Refah Party developed; they took a pro-EU and west-
ern stance. Subsequently, the AK Party moved towards the centre right of Turkey’s 
political spectrum with a fresh neo-liberal outlook under its new leader, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, supported by a pragmatic cadre of businessmen and profession-
als. The newly formed party, a political coalition similar to ANAP, came to power 
in the 2002 elections with a plurality of 34 per cent of total votes. It went on to win 
half of the municipal governments in 2004. The party increased its votes to almost 
47 per cent in the 2007 general elections but lost some local governments in 2009 
(its votes fell from 42 per cent to 38.8 per cent). The graduates of state schools 
providing religious education and many private education institutions linked to Is-
lamic brotherhoods provided the young cadres of the party. Thus, moving from the 
fringe, a visibly devout Muslim middle class took the centre stage in politics and 
the civil service, capitalizing on the ability of their sponsors to promote their own.
The spread of Islamic brotherhoods was a primarily urban phenomenon and 
it built successful alliances with SME owners. Decentralization to markets and 
civil society in diverse forms facilitated the growth of municipal powers and the 
spread of Islamic brotherhood networks at the grassroots level throughout the 
1990s. The inadequacies of the central state’s ability to provide sufficient health, 
education, and general welfare services were exploited by these groups as they 
sought to re-allocate resources and social benefits to their affiliated communities. 
Municipal resources played a key role in the new allocation regimes and they 
paved the way to the popular success of the AK Party. Erdoğan, himself, gained 
initial popularity as the mayor of Istanbul. New entrepreneurialism and a sense 
of independence gave rise to a diverse range of business ventures in growing ur-
ban markets. Small scale manufacturing, all forms of trade and land development 
and new housing created earnings and speculative interests for local businessmen. 
The AK Party moved towards 
the centre right of Turkey’s 
political spectrum with a fresh 
neo-liberal outlook under its 
leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
supported by a pragmatic 
cadre of businessmen and 
professionals
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By winning the municipalities of several 
large towns, Islamist politicians began 
to channel municipal procurement and 
spending to their favored businessmen 
starting from the mid-1990s. Özcan’s 
study of three Anatolian towns, Denizli, 
Gaziantep and Kayseri, reveals a deepen-
ing ideological split as Islamic business 
groups and their fraternity organizations 
pursued their own political agendas, most notably in Kayseri.13 Another study by 
Özcan illustrated how old established business groups, who initiated large local 
development projects in Kayseri, were eliminated from decision-making posi-
tions and new allocation regimes by Islamist mayors and their business allies.14
However, despite their growing role in the economy and society, SMEs and 
their Islamic networks developed strong resentment towards state elites.15 While 
they sought more economic and political power, they were undermined and fre-
quently blocked by the centralist bureaucracy in Ankara. They also saw Turkey’s 
large conglomerates as their rivals and inhibitors in accessing international fi-
nancial and industrial markets. A heated debate around secularism and religious 
revivalism deepened the fault line between Turkey’s old and new middle classes. 
A discourse of marginalization and injustice galvanized Islamic politics as they 
faced sharpening opposition from the establishment, most notably from the army 
and the judiciary. Through their social and community engagement and discourse 
of injustice, Islamic groups managed to capture the moral high ground and gained 
the political support of the lower social strata. Their prolific use of grassroots’ net-
works, civic associations, and neighborhood social circles paid dividends at the 
ballot box, even when they faced legal threats.
Islamic groups have long had the ambition to create autonomous institutions 
separate from the secular state. By forming solidarity platforms and networks they 
aimed to insulate their regime, protect business niches, and create new oppor-
tunities for network members. By launching new business development models 
and capital formations, they built alternative routes to avoid state institutions and 
strengthen their networks. One notable case was the establishment of Anatolian 
holding companies, which quickly spread across many towns, including Deniz-
li, Konya, Yozgat, and Sivas, throughout the 1990s. Promoted and established by 
merchant entrepreneurs and resting mostly on informal structures, these compa-
nies collected small savings from thousands of local families and Turkish workers 
Through their social and 
community engagement and 
discourse of injustice, Islamic 
groups managed to capture the 
moral high ground and gained 
the political support of the 
lower social strata
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in Germany. With the promise of high 
future dividends, no use of interest, and 
a mission to industrialize the homeland, 
they channeled funds to their affiliated 
companies informally and without using 
intermediary financial institutions. Fol-
lowers of Fetullah Gülen, Nakşibendi and 
Süleymancı brotherhoods emerged as 
the key conduits for campaigning among 
Turkish workers in Germany. By using 
religious symbols and signals, companies such as Kombassan and Yimpaş collect-
ed millions of dollars from families. However, some failed to keep their promise to 
their investors and built some audaciously scandalous ponzi schemes.16
The Fetullah Gülen community has been especially active in promoting busi-
nesses and by 2009 is said to have been associated with at least 500 firms. The 
Gülen movement promotes a synthesis between Islam and free market, where Is-
lam assumes a moral value involving economic activity. Among its affiliated assets 
are Asya Bank and Işık Insurance, and the highly influential newspaper, Zaman, 
in addition to the hundreds of schools and seven universities for which the move-
ment is best known. This large number of businessmen, employees, and former 
students provide a loyal mass of economically motivated adherents to the move-
ment.17 These ties expanded business opportunities at home and abroad for its 
affiliated SME owners.
The increasing number of SMEs led to the emergence of new industrial centers 
and fuelled business diversity and competition (see Table 2). The growing rivalry 
between first and second-generation business elites resulted in the fragmenta-
tion of business interest representation. The first Islamist business association, 
MÜSİAD, established in 1990, became a major representative body within a de-
cade.18 MÜSİAD rivals TÜSİAD, which was formed in 1971 to represent leading 
establishment business groups and has offices in the US (Washington), Europe 
(Brussels, Berlin, and Paris), and China (Beijing). MÜSİAD is more aggressive 
internationally with representatives in 40 countries. Of its almost 90 offices, many 
are in Islamic countries. Contrary to TÜSİAD, which advocates an open trade 
regime and integration with EU markets, MÜSİAD promotes economic relations 
with Muslim countries and has a wider regional representation in Anatolian cit-
ies. Most of its member businesses were established in the late 1980s and tend 
to be smaller than their TÜSİAD counterparts. As business interests continue 
to diverge along with the increasing number of export oriented businesses, new 
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solidarity groups and lobbying platforms 
emerge. A new Islamic-leaning group, 
the Turkish Businessmen and Industri-
alists’ Confederation (TUSKON), estab-
lished in 2005, brings together 151 busi-
ness associations with over 14,000 busi-
nesses across the country. 
Although Islamic values are widely 
employed as social glue for interpersonal trust, these new capitalist classes and 
their solidarity platforms are as motivated by self-interest and profit making as 
others. While aligning their interests with the poor and disadvantaged at the low-
er tier of the social strata and by championing justice and fairness, this movement 
formed broader social alliances. During its first government (2002-2007), the AK 
Party pursued “neo-liberal populism” with a veneer of Islamic morals. They ap-
pealed directly to the masses and circumvented, where possible, state institutions. 
Islamic groups allied with the AK Party developed their own power elite and em-
ployed favoritism and corrupt business practices when necessary. Consequently, 
the newly emerging conservative middle classes and large businesses began re-
ceiving new economic privileges.19 For instance, two Turkish state-owned banks, 
Halk Bankası and Vakıfbank, had stepped in to provide 750 million USD in loans 
to Çalık Holding, which is known to maintain close relations with Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, in order to enable it to purchase the second largest media group (ATV-
Sabah). In another transaction, the Turkish government gave Çalık Energy and 
the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) permission to build a 300,000 barrels a day 
(b/d) refinery at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Another example of extra-
mural favoritism occurred in Hatay where AK Party affiliates won a vast majority, 
over 250, small and medium-size government contracts, with even more rumored 
to have been awarded to relatives and friends of party officials. 
Search for a New Identity
A crucial factor in the formation of this new middle class has been its iden-
tity crisis. Rapid urbanization, the penetration of new media, and globalization 
dislocated many traditional values and worldviews in Turkey, as elsewhere. This, 
combined with the increasing role of money and power in society, prompted a 
search for authenticity and a moral anchor to balance the turbulence brought by 
massive societal changes. This trend was further affected by growing economic 
liberalization and the ideological dissolution of the Cold War in the 1980s. Eco-
nomic liberalization took money and entrepreneurialism to the centre of soci-
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etal relations, fundamentally changing 
consumer habits, norms, and values. A 
proliferation of television channels with 
reality shows and sexually provocative 
soap operas, tabloid gossip columns and 
vacuous radio talk program were seen to 
be promoting new values and behaviors 
that deepened an already widely felt sense of insecurity. Many conservatives saw 
these as a sign of cultural decay and an attack on family values. Women, especially, 
became objects of this materialization as well as contestation.20
The end of the Cold War destabilized “traditional-conservative” (right wing) 
and “modern-progressive” (left wing) politics, further deepening the insecurity 
of the middle classes. They responded in an entrepreneurial spirit and sought al-
ternative modus operandi to state sponsored economic modernization and top-
down management. MÜSİAD, TUSKON, and other political-business alliances 
provided one kind of mobilization that served as local social and cultural institu-
tions in addition to their commercial roles. There was also an associated growth of 
community services outside the public sector, including Islamist-leaning private 
schools, hospitals, and NGOs.
However, a discourse of victim-victor dichotomization, narrated through Is-
lamist forums, gave pious Muslims a renewed perception in the 1990s that they 
had long been a kind of underclass. These ideas fed into a rhetoric of suppression, 
alienation, and state conspiracy against the moral and righteous. The fact that the 
Turkish Republic had outlawed Islamic brotherhoods and monopolized religion 
as part of the state administration contributed to this new rhetoric of victimiza-
tion. Islamic groups were depicted as “dangerous” and “backward” in the main-
stream media and such propaganda further fuelled societal alienation, uniting the 
new middle classes and their allied marginal urban groups against their secular 
“oppressors.”
As Islamists strived to form a distinct identity, they used specific symbols 
to signal the link with each other to mobilize their combined efforts, to protect 
themselves, and gain power. However, there is no homogenized Islamic group or 
community, nor is there one unified Islamic ideology and culture in Turkey. Is-
lamic groups frequently present contradictions and ambiguities in their own in-
terpretation of money and morality. It is not always easy to differentiate Islamic 
business groups from others, the so-called “secularists”, as they are now deeply 
embedded within the Turkish economy. Unlike their efforts to avoid the state in 
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the 1990s, since the formation of the first 
AK Party government in 2002, they have 
conducted most of their business with 
formal state institutions and pursued 
modern corporate goals. Symbols of au-
thenticity and moral living have been 
incorporated into their core identity, the 
most significant of which has been the urban form of headscarf (turban).21 The 
prohibition against wearing the headscarf in public offices and state schools was 
first used by the new establishment deliberately to galvanize the sense of exclusion 
and injustice among pious Muslims. While for others who adhered to Islam, but 
considered themselves modern secularists, the politicized headscarf was not an es-
sential part of their identity or religion; they saw it merely as a central element of 
Islamist politics. The headscarves gained a new status in Turkish politics and soci-
ety when most of the leading AK Party ministers’ wives appeared in public wearing 
stylized covers. Paradoxically, the ban on the headscarves has not been lifted and 
the AK Party leaders and their powerful business allies continue to exploit the is-
sue as a symbol of their continuing victimhood. Nevertheless, the piety and justice 
symbolized by headscarves also carries oddities and contradictions. Young women 
increasingly wear headscarves in urban areas along with seemingly immodest and 
“un-Islamic” dresses. Headscarves are now frequently seen accompanying tight 
jeans, heavy make-up, and revealing dresses. Secular or Islamist, Turkey’s middle 
classes are converging towards similar consumption styles while the new Islamist 
business elite surround themselves with luxury brands, new villas, and private 
beaches. Thus, the gap between Turkey’s old and new establishment is narrowing.
In response to this growing convergence between two distinct middle classes, 
Islamist groups are searching for new pillars of authenticity. Direct appeals to 
popular sentiment on issues of private morality and community behavior appear 
to be a growing and seemingly perilous trend. Neighborhood restrictions on the 
sale and drinking of alcohol, suffocating the production and sale of pork products, 
encouraging women to give birth to three children and other actions to encour-
age Islamic values seem to be creeping into the public discourse. This is leading 
to spatially more differentiated and contested responses, as urban neighborhoods, 
coastal and inner Anatolian towns and South-Eastern Kurdish regions continue 
to diverge in their attitudes towards the deepening influence of Islamic morality. 
Thus, there is a wide range of positions and attitudes rather than any uniform 
trend. Hence, we can optimistically argue that Islamic politics in Turkey is likely 
to accommodate these identity contests in democracy. Because so far, it has been 
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driven by pragmatic self-interested business people, not an ideologically minded 
clergy as in the case of Iran. 
A New Era in Foreign Relations
The rise of new business groups did not only change Turkey’s domestic politi-
cal trajectory, it also profoundly affected the country’s foreign relations. Islamist 
groups initially built their own trade and personal connections, in particular in 
the Arab world, the Balkans, and Eurasia. Sometimes they followed in the foot-
steps of the first generation family conglomerates in these markets but they often 
developed their own auxiliary networks using business associations, charities, and 
the Gülen movement’s schools. With the AK Party’s electoral success, however, 
these sporadic initiatives turned into more systematic efforts and brought about 
structural changes in foreign policy.
There are three key important aspects of this new orientation. First, the in-
crease in trade relations with the neighboring regions of the Balkans and the 
Middle East continues to provide a firm foundation to the “zero problem poli-
cy with neighbors” that was initiated by the energetic Foreign Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu. Turkish companies have been successful in penetrating relatively un-
der-developed neighboring markets for over two decades and have been lobbying 
the government for a stronger engagement in the region. For over a decade, Turk-
ish politicians as well as diplomats struggled to formulate new initiatives in for-
eign policy. Pressure from aggressive export oriented SMEs eventually triggered 
more business friendly diplomacy in Ankara. New trade patterns began to play a 
vital role in re-balancing relations with Arab countries. In 2008, the trade volume 
with the Arab world reached 30 billion USD. Turkey is in the process of abolishing 
visas with a number of Arab countries (including Jordan, Lebanon, Libya as well 
as Syria) and Russia. The free trade zone among Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jor-
dan is under discussior and will allow Turkey’s South-Eastern towns to link with 
their historic economic zones. This process has already started in Gaziantep with 
the establishment of the free trade zone with Syria in 2007. Similarly, improving 
relations with Iraq and its Kurdistan Regional Government led to the growth of 
many new business opportunities and investments, making Iraq the fifth largest 
export market (see Table 3). 22 
Second, Turkey has become a network node of international energy trade and 
business opportunities in energy infrastructure development have grown rapidly. 
Domestic energy consumption boomed along with its industrial growth and Tur-
key has now become the second highest consumer of Russian gas in Europe after 
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Germany. In 2008, Turkey consumed 30.3 million oil equivalent tons of gas, the 
vast bulk of which was sourced from Russia and Iran and much of it was linked 
to infrastructure investments of Turkish firms.23 Despite a large trade deficit with 
Russia, economic relations are evolving towards a mutually beneficial direction.24 
Hundreds of Turkish SMEs and large businesses operate in the former Soviet 
space. As of 2007, long-term projects by Turkish contractors were underway in 
Russia, amounting to around 28 billion USD, of which 5 billion USD were newly 
initiated in that year alone. 25
Table 3. The Top 26 Destinations for Turkey’s Exports in 2009 (million $)
2009   Total value (000 USD) 102 142 613
Country 1 Germany  9 783 225
 2 France  6 208 801
 3 United Kingdom  5 915 169
 4 Italy  5 890 484
 5 Iraq  5 123 510
 6 Switzerland 3 931 821
 7 U.S.A  3 222 821
 8 Russia Fed  3 202 398
 9 U.A.E.  2 898 839
 10 Egypt  2 618 193
 11 Spain  2 823 657
 12 Romania  2 215 736
 13 Netherlands  2 123 961
 14 Iran  2 024 863
 15 Libya  1 799 236
 16 Belgium 1 796 330
 17 Algeria  1 780 136
 18 Saudi Arabia  1 771 192
 19 Greece  1 634 388
 20 China  1 599 139
 21 Israel  1 528 459
 22 Syria  1 425 111
 23 Azerbaijan 1 399 399
 24 Bulgaria  1 389 199
 25 Poland  1 321 118
 26 Ukraine  1 033 449
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4
Third, as trade with neighbors and the energy market grow, the image of busi-
ness relations shifts from that of the 1980s and 1990s into new patterns. Turkey 
is no longer dependent on a handful of countries for its exports, as it is actively 
developing economic ties with countries as diverse as South Korea, India, and 
Romania. The growing trade with Arab countries, Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
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Iran attracts businesses interested in growth and new markets. As seen in Table 
4, Russia, Germany, and China were the three leading sources of Turkish imports 
in 2009. The three leading import items are: energy, technology, and cheap con-
sumer goods. Exports are also diversifying, although stable trade makes Germany, 
France, the UK, and Italy still the leading destinations. Growth in exports to Iraq, 
Russia, the UAE, Egypt, Romania, and Iran are impressive. FDI, long dominated 
by the Eurozone, has been affected by the economic downturn and is moving to-
wards a balance of worldwide sources (see Table 5). Chinese Premier Wen Jaibao 
announced an upgrade in China-Turkey relations from a simple bilateral one to 
that of a “strategic partnership” during his visit to Turkey. In a similar vein, Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan proclaimed that “we reached an agreement to increase 
our trade volume with China to 50 billion USD by 2015 and, in the second phase, 
to 100 billion USD by 2020.”
Table 4. The Top 26 Destinations for Turkish Imports in 2009 (million $)
2009   Total value (000 USD)    140 928 421
Country 1 Russia Federation    19 450 086
 2 Germany     14 096 963
 3 China     12 676 573
 4 U.S.A     8 575 737
 5 Italy     7 673 374
 6 France .    7 091 795
 7 Spain 3 776 917
 8 United Kingdom 3 473 433
 9 Iran     3 405 986
 10 South Korea     3 118 214
 11 Romania and Bulgaria    3 374 865
 12 Ukraine     3 156 659
 13 Japan     2 781 971
 14 Netherlands     2 543 073
 15 Belgium    2 371 516
 16 Algeria     2 028 115
 17 Switzerland     1 999 386
 18 India    1 902 607
 19 Sweden     1 890 994
 20 Poland     1 817 093
 21 Saudi Arabia     1 686 743
 22 Kazakhstan     1 348 903
 23 Taiwan     1 342 410
 24 Austria     1 203 634
 25 Greece     1 131 065
 26 Brazil     1 105 890
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 
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While economic affairs are important for international relations, Turkey’s po-
litical capital is not always congruent with trade. The high volume of trade with 
France and Germany does not necessarily drive Turkey’s relations with the EU in 
a positive direction. In contrast, Turkey sees the relatively small but rapidly in-
creasing economic ties with the Arab countries, the Balkans and Eurasia as open-
ing new avenues for regional influence. The “zero problem” policy aims to cement 
long lasting trusting relations with the neighboring governments, seemingly with-
out pushing forward any political agenda. Turkey’s new business groups are not 
interested in promoting Islamist political agendas but rather concentrate just on 
favorable market conditions. Nevertheless, Turkey’s engagement with authoritar-
ian or semi-authoritarian regimes carries future risks. The political elites of these 
regimes feel threatened by the prospect of popular upheavals for democratic rep-
resentation or popular Islamism. Although it is highly appealing, Turkey is not 
necessarily a desirable model for these elites. Similarly, Turkish business groups 
face tougher legal and institutional environments in these countries, especially in 
the former Soviet Union where property rights are not well safeguarded and the 
ruling groups behave erratically and opportunistically.
Table 5. Turkey’s Foreign Direct Investment Inflow by Country (million $)
Countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
European Union (27) 5,006 14,489 12,601 11,051 4,945
Germany 391 357 954 1.211 496
France 2,107 439 367 679 616
Netherlands 383 5,069 5,442 1,343 738
United Kingdom 166 628 703 1,336 350
Italy 692 189 74 249 314
Other European Countries 1,267 7,807 5,061 6,233 2,431
Other European Countries (Excluding EU) 1,646 85 373 291 305
Africa 3 21 5 82 2
USA 88 848 4,212 863 260
Canada 26 121 11 23 52
Central-South America and Caribbean 8 33 494 60 19
Asian 1,756 1,927 1,405 2,361 670
Near and Middle Eastern Countries 1,678 1,910 608 2,199 358
Gulf Arabian Countries 1,675 1,783 311 1,978 206
Other Near and Middle Eastern Countries 2 3 196 96 78
Other Asian Countries 78 17 797 162 312
Other Countries 2 115 36 2 12
Total 8,535 17,639 19,137 14,733 6,265
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/pages/FDIinTurkey.aspx
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Conclusion
We have argued that Anatolian entre-
preneurs changed the politics and econ-
omy of Turkey. They did not displace the 
family conglomerates and old businesses 
but instead engendered the growth of their own groups along with expanding 
market opportunities. These new middle classes are engaged in promoting Islam 
as a strategic resource in the class politics of Turkey and seek protection from the 
negative effects of market capitalism. Although evolving chaotically, this change is 
likely to have long lasting effects on the political economy of the country. There-
fore, the future direction of class mobility and democratic reforms will depend on 
the choices of the new pious middle classes and their newly forming elite in rela-
tion to ethnic nationalism, authoritarian tendencies, and status quo politics. For 
the time being, there are several important implications. 
First of all, this trend brought about further social mobility chances to new 
segments of the society. By breaking into the control exercised by the old state elite 
and their business and local allies, new middle classes and SMEs managed to cre-
ate new opportunities for their rank and file. In doing so, they energized Islamic 
political movements, incorporated multiple techniques for building solidarity 
networks, and aligned their interests with the lower stratum of the society. Thus, 
they used Islam as a strategic resource. They effectively and most critically utilized 
municipal resources to deepen local business networks. With the AK Party gov-
ernments since 2002, they also benefitted from central government funds and pro-
motional activities to generate business opportunities and finance capital for their 
associates. These groups successfully diffused into lower segments of the society 
through charitable institutions and social help. While promoting Islamic political 
agendas among the economically and culturally marginalized urban population, 
they were successful in providing educational and professional opportunities to 
the children of the poor. This class mobility and dynamism is a positive factor in 
economic growth, as it gives SMEs across Anatolia a modern and outward look-
ing perspective. However, this economic change has not yet been fully reflected in 
the quality of public services, access to resources, and equitable growth among the 
regions. Over the past few years Turkey has only marginally improved on its low 
standing in the UN human development index. 
Secondly, the rise of the new middle classes created a split in traditional middle 
class positions in the country due to generational, ideological, and religious fac-
tors. Yet, the inclusion of Islamist politics and the engagement with democratic re-
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forms to meet the EU accession criteria 
widened democratic participation and 
social inclusion, especially most recently 
for the Kurds. However, while suggest-
ing optimism we remain cautious about 
the ability of the new middle classes to 
build a democratic and pluralistic soci-
ety. The reason we counsel caution has 
more to do with middle class opportunism than the stereotypical prejudice about 
the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Evidence from numerous non-
Islamic countries such as Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand point out 
that the regimes the middle classes choose depends among other things on their 
prospects of social mobility. Aside from the consolidated democracies, the posi-
tion of middle classes around the world in supporting democracy against non-de-
mocracy or authoritarianism has been historically inconsistent.26 Although there 
are authoritarian tendencies in the AK Party, it is too early to reach a verdict on 
what kinds of ties will form between a western style plural democracy and the new 
overtly Muslim middle classes. Turkey has the advantage of a highly diversified 
and competitive businesses environment in contrast to authoritarian states domi-
nated by resource dependent economies (such as Russia and Iran), or others with 
cohesive business groups protected by military or dictatorial regimes (as such as 
Egypt today and Spain before 1980). We optimistically believe that these diversi-
fied interests require and can best be served by democracy.
Thirdly, newly emerging middle classes are engaged in promoting Islam as an 
ideology and moral glue in the class politics of Turkey. They concentrated their 
efforts on the protection and re-allocation of wealth and property for their groups 
and affiliated businesses. Liberal economic order and globalization served their in-
terests in securing and expanding business opportunities abroad, especially in the 
developing markets, such as the former communist block, Africa, and the Middle 
East. The political mobilization of Anatolian businessmen under the AK Party, 
while benefitting from the end of the Cold War divisions, destabilized the long 
established positions between right and left wing politics in Turkey. This political 
dislocation brought about a new dynamism and pragmatism in international af-
fairs. A growing assertion of business ties and strategic interests nowadays is rede-
fining Turkey’s external relations with Russia, Iran, and other states in the region. 
These developments require a layered and more complex role for the country in 
its region and beyond. This will not only benefit Islamic leaning business groups 
but also Turkey’s old family conglomerates and others. Capitalists from different 
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dispositions are acting abroad together and filling different gaps. Despite its blun-
ders and opportunistic instincts, this new orientation is likely to improve Turkey’s 
economic influence and diplomatic stance in East-West alliances, affecting its re-
lations with NATO and the EU. 
Finally, we argue that the paradox between modernity and authenticity remains 
unresolved for Turkey’s old middle classes and the new pious elite alike. A similar 
proposition can be argued for the old business establishment and the secular elite 
vis-à-vis the western universal ideals of modernity. Thus, Turkey’s changing do-
mestic and international standing is moving towards multiple identity formations. 
Although new Islamic leaning business groups have become the winners of the 
new regime, they have increasingly lost their cutting edge idealism and originality. 
They are being “normalized” as the new establishment.27 Political sleaze, corrup-
tion in public procurement, and populist trends increasingly define the nature of 
their business operations. Similarly, despite a just and moral business discourse 
promoted by the Islamic groups, unaccountable distribution of business oppor-
tunities continue to prevail under the AK Party governments as they had been for 
Turkey’s previous governments and ruling elites. New re-allocation mechanisms 
generate favored clients and human development priorities are still lagging.
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